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Abstract
This paper studies how a three-layer hierarchical rm (principal-supervisor-
agent) optimally creates e¤ort norms for its employees. The key assumption
is that e¤ort norms are a¤ected by the example of superiors. In equilibrium,
norms are eroded as one moves down the hierarchy. The reason is that, be-
cause exerting e¤ort is costly, the supervisor only partially complies with the
principals example, and thereby transmits a lower norm to the agent. The
principal optimally responds to norm erosion by setting a higher example to
begin with. In equilibrium, norm erosion gives rise to three ine¢ ciencies: the
principal works too hard, the supervisors norm is too high, and the agents
norm is too low. To reduce these ine¢ ciencies, rms should keep the extent of
hierarchy to a minimum, promote employees with the strongest sensitivity to
social norms, and distort managerial spans of control.
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span of control
JEL Classication: D23, M50, M51
I gratefully acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by Robert Dur, Michiel Souverijn,
and Robin Zoutenbier.
yErasmus School of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, and Tinbergen Institute. E-
mail: tichem@ese.eur.nl.
1 Introduction
Empirical research suggests that employees have a preference to conform to social
norms within their rm, even if this requires taking costly actions.1 Given that
employees conform to social norms, rms have an incentive to a¤ect these norms.
After all, a rm only benets from employee conformism to the extent that the
existing norms prescribe to act in the rms interest. From a practical point of view,
an important question is therefore how rms can increase prots by creating e¢ cient
norms. From a theoretical point of view, an important question is whether and how
rmsdesire to create e¢ cient norms can explain rm behavior and organization.
This paper develops and analyzes a theoretical model that yields answers to both
questions.
The novelty of the present analysis is its focus on a particular determinant of
norms for employees, namely the actual behavior of superiors. Apart from being
intuitive, there is empirical evidence suggesting that the example of superiors has
normative implications for subordinates. Treviño et al. (1999) nd a strong negative
correlation between employeesperceptions of, on the one hand, the quality of ethical
leadership of executives and supervisors within their rm, and on the other hand,
unethical behavior within their rm (also see Treviño and Weaver 2003, chapter 9,
where similar evidence is reported). In line with this, Posner and Schmidt (1992)
document that 92% of American managers agree with the statement that "the be-
havior of those in charge is the principle determinant of the ethical tone of my
rm". This view is conrmed by J. Irwin Miller, a successful CEO himself, who
claims that "all of the corporate standards of ethics dont mean anything unless the
persons in the corporation perceive the top people to abide by them when the going
is really tough" (quoted from Murphy and Enderle 1995).
The formal model studied below considers a hierarchical rm that consists of
three layers: a residual claimant principal, a supervisor, and an agent. All players
exert non-veriable e¤ort which yields valuable production for the principals rm.
Both employees (the supervisor and the agent) incur a psychological cost if their
e¤ort falls short of their norm for e¤ort, as in e.g. Fischer and Huddart (2008). To
reect the evidence cited above, employees consider the example of their superior to
be the norm for their own e¤ort. Hence, the principals e¤ort constitutes the norm
for the supervisor, and the supervisors e¤ort constitutes the norm for the agent.
The remaining part of the Introduction describes the results of the paper.
1Important studies documenting this phenomenon are Ichino and Maggi (2000), Falk and Ichino
(2006), Bradley et al. (2007), Mas and Moretti (2009), and Bradler et al. (2013). See the next
section for a detailed discussion of these papers.
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The key result from the analysis is that, in equilibrium, norms are lower as one
moves down the hierarchy. I call this phenomenon norm erosion. Norm erosion
arises because when exerting e¤ort, employees take into account the example of their
superior, but never fully comply with it. The reason is simple: employees nd it
privately optimal to trade o¤ some costs of performing below the norm against the
benet of avoiding some e¤ort costs. It follows that each employee sets an example
for his subordinate that is lower than the example he got from his superior. The
upshot from this result is that e¤ort norms within rms are not only determined
by the example set at the top of the hierarchy, but also by how this example is
transmitted to lower organizational layers. Since rms do not control this process,
they incur a number of costs when creating optimal e¤ort norms for employees, as
explained next.
To understand why norm erosion is costly to rms, one needs to know that there
is a unique rst-best e¤ort norm for employees. This holds because a higher norm
induces more valuable e¤ort from the employee, but also imposes more e¤ort costs
and norm violation costs upon the employee for which he must be compensated
through his salary. The rst-best norm optimally trades o¤ these marginal costs
and benets. Next, when choosing how much e¤ort to exert, the principal has two
objectives in mind. On the one hand, she wants to set the rst-best norm for her
employees. On the other hand, she wants to maximize her own contribution to
rm prots. The e¤ort level that maximizes the principals own contribution to rm
prots is referred to as the principals rst-best e¤ort level. Under a mild assumption
that I use, it holds that the principals rst-best e¤ort level is identical to the rst-
best norm for both employees. It follows that if there were no norm erosion, the
principal would maximize total prots by exerting her rst-best e¤ort level. However,
knowing that the supervisor will erode her example, the principal optimally sets a
higher example to begin with. In this way the principal makes sure that the agents
equilibrium norm is closer to its rst-best level. The cost of this strategy is two-fold:
the principal works ine¢ ciently hard, and the supervisor faces an ine¢ ciently high
norm. Compared to the rst-best case, hierarchical rms are thus confronted with
three ine¢ ciencies in norm creation: the principals e¤ort is too high, the supervisors
norm is too high, and the agents norm is too low. The remaining results show that,
to minimize these ine¢ ciencies, hierarchical rms optimally adjust the way they are
organized.
First, hierarchical rms optimally promote employees with the strongest sensi-
tivity to social norms. A supervisor who is more sensitive to norms will conform to
the principals example to a larger extent. As a result, norms are eroded to a lower
extent, which is always valuable to the principal. The reason is that establishing a
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given e¤ort norm for the agent now requires a lower e¤ort level from the principal.
This is protable since in equilibrium the principal works ine¢ ciently hard and the
supervisors norm is ine¢ ciently high. Alternatively, for a given e¤ort level of the
principal and norm for the supervisor, the agent will be faced with a higher norm.
This is also protable because in equilibrium the agents norm is ine¢ ciently low.
Second, hierarchical rms optimally distort the supervisors span of control, that
is, the number of agents heading under one supervisor. The analysis shows that rms
may set the supervisors span of control both above and below its rst-best level.
The mechanism that produces these results is the following. In the model I assume
that for supervision technology reasons, there is some rst-best supervisor span of
control. When choosing how many supervisors and agents to hire, the principal thus
has an incentive to stick as closely as possible to this exogenously given span of
control. However, the rms prots also depend on which kind of employee faces
the most e¢ cient e¤ort norm in equilibrium. Recall that the equilibrium norm for
supervisors is always above the rst-best level, whereas the equilibrium norm for
agents is always below the rst-best level. Yet, the extent to which equilibrium
norms diverge from the rst-best level may be di¤erent for agents and supervisors.
In fact, the principal optimally makes sure that the kind of employee that is relatively
abundant faces the more e¢ cient norm. The principal does this by raising her own
e¤ort level in the number of agents, and by decreasing her e¤ort in the number
of supervisors. Therefore, given that the supervision technology is such that it is
attractive to hire relatively many agents (supervisors), the principal optimally makes
sure that the e¤ort norm for agents (supervisors) is more e¢ cient than the e¤ort norm
for supervisors (agents), which in turn makes it attractive to hire even more agents
(supervisors). As a result, the principal optimally distorts the supervisors span of
control away from its rst-best level.
Last, hierarchical rms su¤er from norm erosion precisely because they are hi-
erarchical. A straightforward prediction following from the model is therefore that
rms optimally keep the extent of hierarchy to a minimum.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the related literature.
Section 3 develops the formal model. Section 4 solves the model, while section 5
explores implications for organizational design. Section 6 nishes with concluding
remarks.
2 Related literature
Empirical research suggests that employees have a preference to conform to social
norms within their rm. Ichino and Maggi (2000) show that employees engage less
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in misconduct and absent themselves less often if their co-workers are less likely to
do so (also see Bradley et al. 2007). Falk and Ichino (2006) report that, if employees
work in pairs rather than individually, the standard deviation of output is smaller and
output is higher. Moreover, the authors nd that low-productivity employees respond
strongest to working in pairs. Mas and Moretti (2009) nd that supermarket cashiers
improve their performance if a high-productivity cashier enters their shift. As in Falk
and Ichino (2006), this e¤ect is far more pronounced for low-productivity workers
than for high-productivity workers. Mas and Moretti (2009) provide a social pressure
interpretation for their results, based on the nding that cashiers only improve their
performance if this can be observed by the new cashier. Finally, in a controlled work
environment, Bradler et al. (2013) show that the provision of public recognition to
employees improves their performance. Similar to Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas
and Moretti (2009), the authors nd that their results are mainly driven by those
employees who did not receive recognition, and thus learned that they performed
worse than others. For this reason, Bradler et al. (2013) explain their results partly
in terms of employeespreference to conform to a group norm.
An early theoretical paper studying social norms is Akerlof (1980). Akerlofs
(1980) model shows that an existing norm may stay in place if deviating from the
norm leads to a loss in reputation (also see Bernheim 1994, who assumes that people
care for othersperceptions of ones preferences). Another early contribution is the
paper by Kandel and Lazear (1992), who study peer pressure as a mechanism that
may reduce free-riding problems in team production.
More recently, Sliwka (2007) develops a model where agents may prefer to con-
form their e¤ort to the social norm, but are uncertain about what the social norm
prescribes. This opens the door for the principal to a¤ect the agents perception
of the social norm through her own actions. Specically, Sliwka (2007) shows that
o¤ering incentives may be a credible signal that the social norm is to act selshly,
whereas o¤ering no incentives may be a credible signal that the social norm is to
act fairly, that is, to exert at least some e¤ort. Fischer and Huddart (2008) study
rms where norms exist for desirable actions (like exerting e¤ort) and undesirable
actions (like earnings management). The authors show that social norms multiply
the impact of individual incentives on agentsbehavior. The reason is that individ-
ual incentives change an individual agents behavior, but this also a¤ects the social
norm to which all agents want to conform. Fischer and Huddart (2008) also show
that it may be optimal to split rms in parts. The benet is that having separate
departments allows for the cultivation of di¤erent social norms for di¤erent tasks.
Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) study optimal e¢ ciency wage contracts for
morally sensitive agents. The authors assume that the principal can declare what
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the e¤ort norm is at the contracting stage. Stevens and Thevaranjan (2010) show
that, when hiring a morally sensitive agent, the principal may achieve rst-best prof-
its even when she does not use incentives. Huck et al. (2012) dene social norms
in terms of Pareto e¢ ciency. Given this denition, the authors demonstrate that a
social norm makes team-incentives more e¤ective. The reason is that team-incentives
create positive externalities among employees, which leads to a higher social norm for
e¤ort. The opposite reasoning applies to using relative incentives like tournaments.
Huck et al. (2012) further show that, if team incentives are used, social norms may
give rise to multiple equilibria, some of which may lead to ine¢ ciently high social
norms.
Akerlof and Kranton (2005) introduce the notion that a persons utility may
depend on his or her social identity. In their model, a social identity exogenously
implies some norm for behavior. Akerlof and Kranton (2005) show that employ-
ees identifying with the rm accept lower wages and require lower incentives. The
authors consequently claim that it is valuable for rms to invest in changing their
employeesidentity (also see Heinle et al. 2012, who derive optimal contracts when
agents may identify with the rm in a multi-task setting). Carlin and Gervais (2009)
model morality as a self-imposed restriction to exert high e¤ort. In their analysis,
norms are thus a purely personal trait that cannot be a¤ected by the rm in any
way. The authors derive a number of predictions as to how the presence of virtuous
agents in the labor market a¤ect rmsoptimal contract design, project choice, and
extent of bureaucracy.
In contrast to all papers above, the starting point of the analysis here is that the
actual example of superiors determines e¤ort norms for employees. Norms are thus
not exogenously given (as in Akerlof and Kranton 2005, Carlin and Gervais 2009, and
Heinle et al. 2012), but depend on the behavior of superiors. Also, norms cannot
be costlessly declared (as in Stevens and Thevaranjan 2010), but creating norms
requires setting a costly example. Finally, the principal does not only indirectly
inuence norms through making institutional choices (as in Sliwka 2007, Fischer and
Huddart 2008, and Huck et al. 2012), but also directly through setting her own
example.
More distantly related to the present paper is Hermalins (1998) analysis of lead-
ership. Hermalin (1998) studies how a leader can credibly communicate information
to his team-members about the marginal productivity of their e¤ort. One of the
mechanisms Hermalin (1998) considers is leading by example. That is, if the leader
exerts a high e¤ort level and thereby incurs high e¤ort costs, this credibly signals
to the other team-members that exerting e¤ort is valuable. The parallel between
Hermalin (1998) and the present analysis is the importance of the leaders example
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for the behavior of others. However, di¤erent problems are studied. In Hermalins
(1998) analysis the credible transmission of information is at stake, whereas here the
principal sets her example so as to create optimal e¤ort norms for her employees.
Finally, another important di¤erence with the existing literature is that the
present analysis considers hierarchical rms that consist of at least three layers.
Hence, I do not only study how the example at the top of the hierarchy matters for
e¤ort norms, but also the process of transmitting this example to lower layers of the
hierarchy. In fact, the key result of the paper is to show that this process is ine¢ cient
from the rms perspective.
3 A model of e¤ort norms in hierarchical rms
Consider a hierarchical rm owned by one principal. The principals organizational
layer is denoted by l = 0. In the most basic specication of the model, the principal
hires one supervisor (l = 1) and one agent (l = 2) (subsection 5.2 extends the model
to the case where the principal hires S supervisors and A agents). All players exert
unveriable e¤ort el, which yields valuable production for the principals rm. The
marginal product of e¤ort is given by pl. I assume that pl  pl+1, implying that a
player in a higher layer of the organization has a weakly higher marginal productivity.
The costs of exerting e¤ort are given by 1
2
e2l .
Employee utility from the job is given by:
Ul = wl   1
2
e2l  
1
2
 (nl   el)2 , (1)
where wl denotes a xed wage (in the Appendix, I show that as long as employees
are risk averse, the results of the paper are insensitive to the use of performance
pay). The last term in (1) describes the employees preference for conforming to
social norms, which consists of two parts. The term nl   el describes how much the
employees e¤ort di¤ers from the norm for e¤ort, nl. The parameter  reects the
strength of the employees sensitivity to norms. In the basic model,  is assumed
to be identical for all employees (section 5.1 extends the model to the case where
employees di¤er in norm sensitivity). Throughout the paper, I assume that the
principal can observe . The outside option utility is assumed to be identical for all
employees, and equal to u = 0.
The novelty of the model is how social norms for e¤ort are determined. Formally,
the e¤ort norm for an employee in organizational layer l is given by:
nl = el 1
pl
pl 1
. (2)
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The e¤ort norm consists of two parts. First, as laid out in the Introduction, the
actual behavior of superiors plays an important role in shaping norms within orga-
nizations. Hence, I assume that the supervisors norm is a¤ected by the principals
e¤ort, and the agents norm is a¤ected by the supervisors e¤ort.2 Second, I assume
that employees are aware of the fact that their superiors e¤ort may be more valu-
able than their own (pl 1 > pl). If this is the case, from an e¢ ciency point of view,
the superior should work harder than the employee. For this reason, I assume that
employees do not consider their superiors e¤ort to be normative to the extent that
the superiors marginal productivity is higher. This behavioral assumption implies
that, qualitatively, the results of the paper do not depend on di¤erences in marginal
productivities pl. For convenience, I therefore solve the model assuming that mar-
ginal productivities are identical across organizational layers, that is, pl = p for all
l. It follows that norms are given by:
nl = el 1. (3)
The order of the game is as follows. First, the principal exerts an e¤ort level,
and thereby sets an example. Second, the principal hires at least one supervisor and
one agent, and o¤ers all employees a compensation contract. Third, the employees
decide whether or not to accept the contract. If one of them rejects the contract, the
game ends. Last, if all employees accepted the contract, they exert e¤ort and payo¤s
realize. In the next section, I solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
by using backwards induction.
4 Analysis
4.1 Contractible e¤ort
In this subsection, I derive the rst-best benchmark where the employeese¤ort is
veriable and thus contractible. First note that, to satisfy the employeesparticipa-
tion constraint, they must be paid a minimum salary equal to:
wl =
1
2
e2l +
1
2
 (nl   el)2 . (4)
2The agents norm may also directly be a¤ected by the example of the principal. However, this
would not a¤ect the results of the paper qualitatively, as long as the agent attaches a non-negative
weight to the example of the supervisor. This is not a strong assumption, since supervisors typically
represent the rm and its policies toward their subordinates.
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Given the lowest possible salary (4), and taking into account that the norm for layer
l is given by the e¤ort level exerted in layer l   1, rm prots can be written as:
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ pe1   1
2
e21  
1
2
 (e0   e1)2| {z }
supervisor (l=1)
+ pe2   1
2
e22  
1
2
 (e1   e2)2| {z }
agent (l=2)
. (5)
Maximizing rm prots (5) over all playerse¤ort levels yields that all players opti-
mally exert the e¤ort level eFBl =
p

. From this it follows directly that the rst-best
e¤ort norm for employees is given by nFBl =
p

. First-best prots become:
FB =
1
2
p2
|{z}
principal (l=0)
+
1
2
p2
|{z}
supervisor (l=1)
+
1
2
p2
|{z}
agent (l=2)
. (6)
Lemma 1 In the rst-best case where e¤ort is contractible, all players exert the
e¤ort level eFBl =
p

. The rst-best e¤ort norm for both employees therefore equals
nFBl =
p

.
Note that, when choosing her e¤ort, the principal has two objectives in mind.
On the one hand, she wants to maximize her individual production (rst term of
(5)). On the other hand, she wants to set the most e¢ cient norm for the supervisor
(second term of (5)). However, the principal does not face a trade-o¤ between these
two objectives. That is, the rst-best e¤ort level eFB0 both maximizes the principals
individual production, and sets the most e¢ cient norm for the supervisor. The reason
is that the principal and the supervisor have the same marginal productivity of e¤ort
p. Moreover, even if the supervisor had a lower marginal productivity than the
principal (p1 < p0), the principal would not face a trade-o¤ between the objectives
mentioned above. This holds because of the assumption that, to the extent that
the principals marginal productivity is higher, the supervisor does not consider the
principals e¤ort level to be normative (see equation (2)). Also note that the exact
same considerations apply when the principal mandates the supervisors e¤ort level.
In the next subsection, I show that when e¤ort is not contractible, the principal does
face a trade-o¤ between maximizing the value of her own production and setting
e¢ cient norms for her employees.
4.2 Non-contractible e¤ort
In case e¤ort is not contractible, the rst step in solving the model is to derive the
employeese¤ort level for any given e¤ort norm and compensation contract. Since
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the employees wage wl is xed, the e¤ort level that maximizes employee utility (1)
equals:
el = nl, (7)
where   
+
, and it holds that 0 <  < 1. It can easily be veried that employee
e¤ort increases in , and therefore in the employees norm sensitivity . The intuition
is that deviating from the norm is more costly for an employee who possesses stronger
norm sensitivity. Next, employee e¤ort also increases in the norm nl, as a higher
norm implies higher costs of norm violation for a given level of e¤ort. Finally, since
it holds that  < 1, an employee always exerts less e¤ort than his norm prescribes.
The intuition is that employees trade o¤ some costs of performing below the norm
against the benet of shirking. This simple fact has an important implication for
hierarchical rms, namely that each employee transmits a norm towards the next
layer of the organization that is lower than the norm he faces himself. Therefore, as
one moves down the hierarchy, e¤ort norms decrease. I call this phenomenon norm
erosion. The existence of norm erosion is the rst result of the analysis, and all
remaining results follow from this one.
Proposition 1 A feature of hierarchical rms is norm erosion, that is, nl > n

l+1
for all l.
The second step in solving the model is to derive the optimal wage wl. The
optimal wage is the lowest possible wage that induces the employee to accept the
job, conditional on the e¤ort level the employee exerts (el ), and the norm he faces
(nl). This constraint reads Ul (wl; el ; nl)  0. Rewriting this condition to wl yields:
wl =
1
2
n2l . (8)
The employees wage increases in the norm he faces. The reason is two-fold. First, a
higher norm induces the agent to exert more e¤ort. Second, given his e¤ort choice,
a higher norm implies that the agent will incur higher costs of norm violation. The
optimal wage also increases in , and therefore in employee norm sensitivity . Norm
sensitivity has two e¤ects on the wage. First, the employee incurs higher costs of
e¤ort if norm sensitivity is stronger, implying the wage must increase. Second,
norm sensitivity has two e¤ects on the employees costs of norm violation. On the
one hand, given his e¤ort level, stronger norm sensitivity implies that the employee
incurs greater psychological costs from performing below the norm. On the other
hand, higher norm sensitivity implies that the employee exerts a higher e¤ort level,
which reduces the violation of the norm. However, the net e¤ect of norm sensitivity
on the wage is always positive, as made apparent by equation (8).
10
The nal step in solving the model is to derive the principals e¤ort level. Condi-
tional on the denition of e¤ort norms (3), the employeese¤ort levels (7) and wages
(8), total rm prots can be written as:
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
supervisor (l=1)
+ p2e0   1
2
3e20| {z }
agent (l=2)
. (9)
Clearly, the principals e¤ort not only a¤ects the value of her individual production
(rst term), but, by setting an example, also a¤ects the value of hiring the supervisor
(second term) and the agent (third term). This is also reected in the e¤ort level the
principal optimally exerts. Maximizing rm prots over e0 yields that this is equal
to:
e0 =
p

1 + + 2
1 + + 3
. (10)
It can be easily checked that the principals e¤ort exceeds the rst-best level derived
in Lemma 1. This is the second result of the analysis:
Proposition 2 The principal exerts an e¤ort level that is higher than her rst-best
e¤ort level (e0 > e
FB
0 ).
To understand the result of Proposition 2, recall from Lemma 1 that the rst-
best norm for the supervisor and agent is given by nFBl =
p

. Hence, if the principal
would exert the e¤ort level eFB0 =
p

, she would maximize the value of her individual
production, and set the rst-best norm for the supervisor. However, as derived in
Proposition 1, the supervisor will erode the principals example. The implication
is that, if e0 =
p

, the equilibrium norm for the agent will be ine¢ ciently low. In
response to this, the principal optimally sets a higher example to begin with, and
thus raises her e¤ort above eFB0 .
Note that the result of Proposition 1 directly implies that the supervisors norm
is above the rst-best level (recall that nFBl =
p

). In addition to this, it holds that
the agents norm is below the rst-best level.3 Intuitively, it can never be optimal
that the agents norm exceeds the rst-best level. After all, driving the agents
norm closer to the rst-best level imposes two costs on the principal: the principals
e¤ort is ine¢ ciently high (Proposition 2), and as a result, the supervisors norm is
ine¢ ciently high. It follows that it may be optimal to raise the agents norm up to
the rst-best level, but not higher than that. Hence, norm erosion ultimately implies
the following Corollary.
3To see this formally, note that the inequality n2 < n
FB
2 reduces to
1 2
1++3 > 0, which always
holds because 0 <  < 1.
11
Corollary 1 Compared to the rst-best benchmark, the e¤ort norm for the supervi-
sor is ine¢ ciently high (n1 > n
FB
1 ), whereas the e¤ort norm for the agent is ine¢ -
ciently low (n2 < n
FB
2 ).
Another result that norm erosion gives rise to is described in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Firms optimally keep the number of organizational layers to a mini-
mum.
The intuition behind Corollary 2 is straightforward. So far, the analysis has shown
that hierarchical rms are confronted with three ine¢ ciencies in creating optimal
norms for employees: the principal works too hard, the supervisors norm is too
high, and the agents norm is too low. Hierarchical rms incur these costs because
of norm erosion, which arises if intermediate layers of management are in place.
Moreover, for any organizational layer added to the rm, the ine¢ ciencies from
norm erosion would be magnied. It follows that rms optimally keep the number
of organizational layers to a minimum. In the remainder of the paper, I assume that
the principal requires supervisors to let agents do their job. A motivation for this
assumption is that the principal simply cannot supervise all the agents she hires, and
hence needs to delegate this task. Also see subsection 5.2, where I study how many
supervisors and agents the principal optimally hires.
5 Implications for organizational design
This section o¤ers two extensions of the basic model analyzed above. Both extensions
yield a result as to how hierarchical rms can be better designed to reduce the
ine¢ ciencies stemming from norm erosion. In following order, I discuss promotion
decisions and managerial spans of control.
5.1 Promotion decisions
In contrast to what has been assumed in the basic model, employees are likely to
di¤er in their sensitivity to social norms. Given this heterogeneity, a natural question
is which kind of employee the principal should optimally promote to the position of
supervisor. To study this question, denote by q the norm sensitivity of employee q,
and by r the norm sensitivity of employee r. Using the denition   + , one can
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also dene q and r. Firm prots can now be written as:
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ pqe0  
1
2
qe
2
0| {z }
supervisor (l=1)
+ pqre0  
1
2
2qre
2
0| {z }
agent (l=2)
, (11)
where it has been assumed that employee q is appointed supervisor.
Next, the principal optimally exerts the level of e¤ort that maximizes rm prots.
This e¤ort level can be shown to be equal to:
e0 =
p

1 + q + qr
1 + q + 
2
qr
, (12)
which is greater than the rst-best level, as in Proposition 2. Equilibrium prots
become:
 =
1
2
p2

 
1 + q + qr
2
1 + q + 
2
qr
. (13)
Note that in case employee r is promoted to the position of supervisor, equilibrium
prots are simply given by interchanging the subscripts q and r in (13).
To determine whether the principal optimally promotes employee q or r, one can
compute which case yields higher prots. Promoting employee q yields higher prots
than promoting employee r if:
1
2
p2

 
1 + q + qr
2
1 + q + 
2
qr
>
1
2
p2

 
1 + r + rq
2
1 + r + 
2
rq
. (14)
After some rewriting, this inequality reduces to q > r. In words, it is most
protable to promote the employee who has the strongest sensitivity to norms.
Proposition 3 Hierarchical rms optimally promote employees with the strongest
sensitivity to social norms.
The intuition behind this result can be explained as follows. If the supervisor
possesses stronger norm sensitivity, norms are eroded to a lower extent. Less norm
erosion is always valuable to the principal. On the one hand, for any given e¤ort
choice of the principal, the agent will face a higher norm in equilibrium. Since the
agents norm is always ine¢ ciently low (Corollary 1), this is prot-increasing. On the
other hand, the principal can reduce her e¤ort such that the agents norm remains the
same. This is also prot-increasing, since the principals e¤ort and the supervisors
norm are always ine¢ ciently high (Proposition 2 and Corollary 1).
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5.2 Managerial spans of control
The basic model assumes that the principal hires only one supervisor and one agent.
More realistic is that the rm hires a number of S supervisors and A agents. More-
over, rms tend to maintain some relationship between the number of hired supervi-
sors and agents. In the literature, the number of agents heading under one supervisor
is referred to as the supervisors span of control. Analogously, the number of super-
visors heading under the principal is referred to as the principals span of control. In
this extension, I study how managerial spans of control are a¤ected by the principals
desire to create e¢ cient norms for her employees.
In case the rm hires S supervisors and A agents, rm prots are given by:
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ S (pe1   w1)  1
2
k1S
2| {z }
supervisors (l=1)
+ A (pe2   w2)  1
2
k2A
2| {z }
agents (l=2)
, (15)
where w1 and w2 must satisfy the employeesparticipation constraint (4). The prot
function above is di¤erent from the one used in the basic model in two respects.
First, to obtain an interior solution, I assume that the marginal protability from
hiring a supervisor or agent is decreasing. This is reected by the terms  1
2
k1S
2
and  1
2
k2A
2. Second, the parameters k1 and k2 together describe the supervision
technology of the rm. As will be shown below, for low values of k1 and high values of
k2, the principal needs relatively many supervisors to supervise the agents, whereas
for high values of k1 and low values of k2 the reverse holds.
Before I derive the optimal managerial spans of control, it is instructive to consider
the rst-best benchmark where e¤ort is contractible. Using the results from Lemma
1, it is straightforward to derive the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 In the rst-best case where e¤ort is contractible, the principal hires SFB =
1
2
p2
k1
supervisors and AFB = 1
2
p2
k2
agents. The rst-best supervisor span of control is
equal to
 
A
S
FB
= k1
k2
.
In the rst-best case, there is no moral hazard problem in e¤ort provision. Since
supervisors and agents have the same marginal productivity of e¤ort, it follows that
di¤erences in the marginal protability of hiring a supervisor or agents can only arise
because of di¤erences in the technology parameters k1 and k2. As a result, in the
rst-best case, the optimal supervisor span of control is uniquely determined by k1
and k2.
In the remainder of this subsection, I study the optimal managerial spans of
control in case e¤ort is not contractible. Given the denition of e¤ort norms (3),
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employeese¤ort choice (7), and the employeessalary (8), rm prots can be written
as:
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ S

pe0   1
2
e20

  1
2
k1S
2| {z }
supervisors (l=1)
+ A

p2e0   1
2
3e20

  1
2
k2A
2| {z }
agents (l=2)
.
(16)
The principal will exert the e¤ort level that maximizes (16), which is given by:
e0 =
p

1 + S+ A2
1 + S+ A3
. (17)
It holds that e0 > e
FB
0 for any A > 0, as in Proposition 2. It can easily be checked
that the principals e¤ort decreases in S, but increases in A.4 To understand these
results, remember that the norm for supervisors is always above its rst-best level,
whereas the norm for agents is always below its rst-best level (Corollary 1). Further,
if the number of supervisors increases, their organizational layer makes up a larger
share of rm prots. Therefore it becomes more important for the principal to have
supervisors face an e¢ cient norm. It follows that the principal optimally reduces her
e¤ort if S increases. The reverse intuition holds for the number of agents hired. The
principal thus adjusts her e¤ort in the direction that improves the e¤ort norm for
the kind of employee that becomes more abundant.
Proposition 4 The principals e¤ort decreases in the number of supervisors hired,
@e0
@S
< 0, and increases in the number of agents hired, @e

0
@A
> 0.
The next step is to determine the optimal values of S and A. Given the principals
e¤ort choice (17), rm prots can be written as:
 =
1
2
p2

(1 + S+ A2)
2
1 + S+ A3
  1
2
k1S
2   1
2
k2A
2. (18)
4To see this, note that:
@e0
@S
=  p

3A (1  )
(1 + S+A3)
2 < 0, and
@e0
@A
=
p

2 (1  ) (1 + S)
(1 + S+A3)
2 > 0.
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The rst-order conditions to S and A are given by:
1
2
p2


1 + A4 (2S   A+ 2A) + 2A3 + S22 + 2S
(1 + S+ A3)2
= k1S, and (19)
1
2
p2

2
(2  ) (1 + 2S+ S22) + A2 (2 + 2S+ A3)
(1 + S+ A3)2
= k2A, (20)
respectively. Although the rst-order conditions are di¢ cult to solve algebraically,
they are instructive in two ways.
First, given the rst-best solutions SFB and AFB derived in Lemma 2, both (19)
and (20) are negative.5 Hence, the rst-best solutions cannot be optimal in case
e¤ort is not contractible. Moreover, since k1 and k2 are assumed to be su¢ ciently
large such that the second-order conditions are negative, in the optimum it must hold
that S < SFB and A < AFB.6 The intuition behind this result is straightforward.
In case e¤ort is not contractible, a moral hazard problem in e¤ort provision arises.
This problem is partly mitigated because employees are sensitive to social norms.
However, as shown in Corollary 1, equilibrium norms for supervisors are always
above rst-best, whereas equilibrium norms for agents are always below rst-best.
As a result, it is less attractive to hire supervisors and agents. The implication is
that the principals span of control is distorted downwards relative to the rst-best
case.
Second, the marginal benet of hiring an agent (LHS of (20)) may be higher than
the marginal benet of hiring a supervisor (LHS of (19)). Rewriting this inequality
5One can verify that, given the rst-best solutions from Lemma 2, (19) and (20) reduce to:
@
@S
=  
1
2
p2
 (1  )
(k1p23 + k2p2+ 2k1k2)
2

p45k21 + 2p
44k1k2 + p
42k22+
4p23k21k2 + 4p
2k1k
2
2 + 4
2k21k
2
2

< 0, and
@
@A
=  
1
2
p2
 (1  )
(k1p23 + k2p2+ 2k1k2)
2
24 p23k1  2p2k2 + 3p2k1 + 4k1k2+4  p2k1k22 + k21k22  1 +   2+
p42k22
 
1  2 + 3
35 < 0,
where the signs follows from 0 <  < 1, p > 0,  > 0, k1 > 0, and k2 > 0.
6The second-order conditions are given by:
@2
@S2
=
1
2
p2

26 (1  )2 A
2
(A3 + S+ 1)
3   k1, and
@2
@A2
=
1
2
p2

24 (1  )2 (S+ 1)
2
(A3 + S+ 1)
3   k2,
which are always negative if k1 and k2 are su¢ ciently large.
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yields:
A >
1 + S
2
. (21)
Hence, given that agents are relatively abundant, the marginal benet of hiring an
agent exceeds the marginal benet from hiring a supervisor. The intuition behind
this result stems directly from Proposition 4. Recall that this Proposition essentially
states that the principal sets her e¤ort level such that the most abundant kind of
employee faces the more e¢ cient norm in equilibrium. Therefore, given that agents
are relatively abundant, the principal ensures that the equilibrium norm for agents
is closer to its rst-best level than the equilibrium norm for supervisors.7 It follows
that hiring agents yields a higher marginal benet. Of course, the reverse may also
hold: given that supervisors are relatively abundant, their marginal benet is higher.
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Figure 1. Firm prots as a function
of S and A. p
2

= 20,  = 0:5,
k1 = 0:1, and k2 = 1.
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
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Figure 2. Firm prots as a function
of S and A. p
2

= 20,  = 0:5, k1 = 1,
and k2 = 0:1.
Finally, each of the mechanisms described above may be at work in equilibrium,
depending on the values of k1 and k2. Figures 1 and 2 provide contour plots of
the prot function (18) for a certain parameterization of the model. The inner
contours represent a higher prot level than the outer contours, implying that the
7In fact, the norm for agents is closer to the rst-best level than the norm for supervisors
when it holds that
n2   nFB2  < n1   nFB1 . Taking into account that n1 = e0, n2 = e0, and
nFB1 = n
FB
2 =
p
 , one can show that this inequality is identical to condition (21).
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maximum of the prot function is represented by the dots in the inner contours.
In both gures, the 45-degrees line depicts the rst-best supervisor span of control, 
A
S
FB
= k1
k2
. Figure 1 depicts a case where the rst-best supervisor span of control is
low (k1
k2
= 0:1). Next, as can be seen in the plot, the maximum of rm prots (18) lies
above the 45-degrees line, meaning that the principal distorts the supervisors span of
control downwards relative to the rst-best case. The reason is that the supervision
technology is such that it is attractive to hire relatively many supervisors. However,
as described above, given that supervisors are relatively abundant, the principal
optimally makes sure that supervisorse¤ort norms are closer to the rst-best level
than agentse¤ort norms. As a result, supervisors become even more attractive to
hire, implying that the principal optimally distorts the supervisors span of control
downwards. Figure 2 depicts a case where the rst-best supervisor span of control is
high (k1
k2
= 10). By the same logic as above, the principal then optimally distorts the
supervisors span of control upwards. The nal Proposition summarizes the results
of this subsection.
Proposition 5 Relative to the rst-best case, hierarchical rms optimally distort the
principals span of control downwards. Relative to the rst-best case, the supervisors
span of control is optimally distorted downwards if k1
k2
low, and optimally distorted
upwards if k1
k2
is high.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper sets out to study the problem of creating e¤ort norms within hierarchical
rms. The analysis presented above rests on one key premise, namely that the actual
example of superiors determines e¤ort norms for subordinates. Norms are therefore
shaped by two factors: the ultimate example set by those at the top of the hierarchy,
like the CEO, and the process of transmitting this example to lower levels of the
rm. Importantly, rms cannot control the process of norm transmission. After all,
each hierarchical layer sets her own example for the next one. Consequently, norm
transmission is prone to a moral hazard problem: no employee fully conforms with
the norm he faces himself, as conforming requires him to exert costly e¤ort. The
implication is that, in equilibrium, norms erode as one moves down the hierarchy. To
counteract the norm erosion e¤ect, it has been shown that top managers optimally set
a higher example to begin with. This is well in line with the fact that top managers
work exceptionally long and hard. In addition to this, norm erosion gives rise to
two comparative static results on the e¤ort of top managers. Their e¤ort decreases
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in the number of middle-managers hired, and increases in the number of lower-level
employees hired.
The analysis also yields three implications for organizational design. First, the
ine¢ ciencies due to norm erosion imply that rms optimally keep the extent of
hierarchy to a minimum. Second, to reduce norm erosion, hierarchical rms optimally
promote employees with the strongest sensitivity to social norms. Last, hierarchical
rms optimally distort supervisor spans of control. The mechanism driving this result
is that the relative protability of hiring middle-managers and lower-level employees
depends on whose equilibrium norm is more e¢ cient.
Appendix: Allowing for Performance Pay
In this Appendix, I show that the results of the paper are not sensitive to the intro-
duction of performance pay, as long as using performance pay generates some kind
of agency costs.8 Suppose that employee e¤ort yields a veriable signal yl = pel + ",
where " reects noise in the signal. The expected value of " equals E ["] = 0, and "
has a variance equal to 2" > 0. Denote by sl the base salary and by bl the incentive
intensity of the employees contract. I assume that using performance pay is costly
because employees are risk-averse. To model this assumption, employee utility is
given by:
Ul =   exp r[sl+bl(pel+")  12 e2l  12(nl el)
2] , (22)
where r > 0 denotes the intensity of risk-aversion. The certainty equivalent of (22)
is given by:
E [Ul] = sl + blpel   1
2
e2l  
1
2
 (nl   el)2   1
2
r2"b
2
l . (23)
This is the same utility function as in (1), but with two terms added. The term
blpel describes the incentive portion of the employees compensation. The term
1
2
r2"b
2
l describes the risk-related disutility which performance pay imposes upon the
employee.
The model can now be solved, following the same three steps as in subsection
4.2. First, given the contract and e¤ort norm, employees choose the e¤ort level that
maximizes their utility. This e¤ort level can be shown to be equal to:
el = bl + nl, (24)
8As will be shown below, if there are no agency costs of using incentives, the principal can
achieve the rst-best outcome derived in section 4.1.
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where   p
+
and   
+
. Equation (24) shows that employee e¤ort not only
increases in the norm, but also in the incentive intensity of his contract.
Second, given employee e¤ort (24), the lowest possible base salary that ensures
participation can be written as:
sl =
1
2
n2l +
1
2
pb2l +
1
2
r2"b
2
l   blpel . (25)
Last, given employee e¤ort (24) and the base salary (25), the principal chooses
her e¤ort and the incentive intensities such that rm prots are maximized. This
problem can be written as:
max
e0;b1;b2
 = pe0   1
2
e20| {z }
principal (l=0)
+ p (b1 + e0)  1
2
e20  
1
2
pb21  
1
2
r2"b
2
1| {z }
supervisor (l=1)
+ (26)
p [b2 +  (b1 + e0)]  1
2
 (b1 + e0)
2   1
2
pb22  
1
2
r2"b
2
2| {z }
agent (l=2)
.
The solutions to the maximization problem are given by:
e0 =
p

1 + + 2   22 1+
r2"+p+
2
1 + + 3   22 2
r2"+p+
2
, (27)
b1 =
p+ 2p
2 (1 + ) + (p+ r2") (1 + + 
3)
, and (28)
b2 =
p
p+ r2"
. (29)
It is easy to check that, if using incentives is costly (r > 0 and 2" > 0), it holds that
1 > b1 > b

2. Hence, both employees receive an incentive share below 1, implying
that employees will not fully internalize the benets of their e¤ort to the principal.
As a result, norms will be eroded, as in Proposition 1. Since all the other results
are driven by the existence of norm erosion, it holds that the results are insensitive
to the introduction of performance pay. However, note that in case using incentives
is costless (r = 0 or 2" = 0), norm erosion can be avoided and all players exert
the rst-best e¤ort level, el = e
FB
l =
p

. The reason is that the principal optimally
provides full-powered incentives to the employees, that is, b1 = b

2 = 1.
Finally, if using incentives is costly, it is found that the supervisor receives
stronger incentives than the agent. The intuition behind this result is that pro-
viding incentives to the supervisor has the additional benet of raising the norm for
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the agent. Interestingly, this result is in line with Aggarwal and Samwick (2003),
who document that CEOs receive stronger incentives than executives with oversight
authority, who in turn receive stronger incentives than managers with divisional
responsibility.
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